October 2024 isn’t the first time that Japan and its most important ally have had elections at the same time – in fact, this is the sixth time that Japan’s elections have coincided with the United States, the others being June 2000, Sept-Oct 1996, June 1980, Oct-Nov 1960, and Aug-Oct 1952. This confluence has never really mattered – Japan rarely registers with U.S. voters at the ballot box and while the United States may weigh more heavily on minds in Japan, it’s rare for those concerns to overtake the usual priorities of kitchen table issues and competent governance.
That aspect certainly won’t change this time. Japan’s voters are far more focused on the fallout of the LDP’s spending scandal and are poised to give the party a bloody nose, with the only question being how bad it will be. The other key issues, like inflation, economic growth, and so on, fit into the public’s usual concerns about what they expect their governments to provide. On the U.S. side, there’s a commonly (and unfairly) held belief that Republican administrations are “good” for Japan and Democratic administrations are “bad” for Japan, an assumption that has more to do with perception than substance. If Trump were to win, it could have some practical effects on Japan’s domestic politics – Motegi Toshimitsu might use his experience negotiating with the Trump administration in a potential future LDP leadership race, for example, though that probably wouldn’t be able to make up for drawbacks like his relative obscurity with the public or his unpopularity with his colleagues. Japan’s voters will certainly pay attention to what happens on November 5, but it’s fairly low on their list of priorities.
That might change in the future, however. Between the LDP reeling from scandals and internal divisions, the relative weakening of the LDP’s traditional coalition partner, Komeito, and the opposition parties feeling an opportunity, Japan’s politics could be in for more tumult than it’s seen in decades. Changes of government, new parties, and party realignments might not happen immediately, but the stagnant perceptions of politics in each country will need an updat. In the past, attitudes towards the United States were one of the best predictors for party affiliation in Japan. Those attitudes might once again become very salient if party competition becomes renewed, and the competing visions those parties hold for East Asia and for Japan’s security alliance may begin to clash.
Changes and realignments may not happen immediately, but the stagnant perceptions of politics in each country will need an update
For their part, U.S. decision makers may find that they have more of a stake in the outcome of Japan’s elections than in the past. Memories of Hatoyama Yukio and the Democratic Party of Japan’s interregnum will of course weigh on the memory, but there’s an arguably more pressing concern that the elevation of right-wing figures like Takaichi Sanae would jeopardize U.S. priorities in the Indo-Pacific, chiefly the trilateral agreement between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. If Ishiba Shigeru emerges from the election relatively unscathed, on the other hand, he may feel emboldened to pursue his long-term goal of restructuring the U.S.-Japan relationship into more of an equal alliance, in which Japan takes more direct responsibility for its own security and has more decision-making latitude in terms of security and international relations. Such a development might be cautiously welcomed by some stakeholders in the United States, but there would be resistance from other quarters – not least since a more independent Japanese security policy could add significant complications to the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, Japan’s political partisans will need to update their priors regarding U.S. politics, even if those priors may be deep-seated and not easily abandoned. Republicans may no longer be “better” for Japan’s interests as many claim, but that assumption is still held by many members of the LDP, reinforced by frustrations that Democrats are “soft” on China or too focused on values or other normative concerns. Japan’s traditional left, for its part, has been deeply skeptical of U.S. presence, even if the outrage that punctuated early postwar relations is old history. Their skepticism was reinforced, fairly or not, by the Obama administration’s negative response to Hatoyama’s concept of a plan to relocate a U.S. base in Okinawa – an early failure for the DPJ government which was seen to significantly undermine its authority.
The people in Japan who would most welcome the return of Trump and his Republican Party – the conservatives, right-wingers, China hawks, and so on – probably stand to be the ones who will be most disappointed by the reality of a second Trump administration. Trump’s approach to geopolitics has been consistently transactional and driven by personality, and he and his advisors have shown little regard for the complex mesh of treaties and security arrangements that bind the United States to its allies. A second Trump administration would likely continue to view the United States’ security guarantee not as important treaty obligations, but as a kind of geopolitical protection racket in which nations who host U.S. bases and troops should be shaken down for more money in return. Trump’s reputed “tough on China” stance largely seems to stem from a combination of hardline views on trade deficits, and a personality clash with Xi Jinping; it is notable that he has also expressed ambivalence about the idea of the United States defending Taiwan from potential attack. The biggest fear for Japan’s conservatives, and indeed for the country overall, is the likelihood that either China will do a better job of flattering and building bridges to a second Trump administration, emulating the approach taken by Russian and North Korean leaders; or that the complexity of the region and an early failure to win high-profile successes here will lead the Trump administration to lose interest and begin disengaging from the Indo-Pacific, leaving regional allies to handle threats from China and North Korea alone.
Those in Japan who would most welcome the return of Trump stand to be the ones most disappointed by the reality of his second term
Harris, for her part, would be a conventional Democratic president, consistent with the Obama and Biden administrations – although there remains the caveat that foreign policy has never been a major priority in her career, coming instead from a legal background. Nonetheless, she would likely follow Obama and Biden in terms of emphasizing the United States’ commitment to its treaty allies, including those in the Indo-Pacific. This does not, however, mean that a Harris administration would be entirely easy sailing for Japan’s government. Economically, she is likely to continue along a similar path to Biden in most regards – including his move towards “worker-centered approach to trade policy”, which in practice has meant a range of protectionist policies such as tariffs and subsidies that are designed to encourage domestic production in key industries.
Despite these potential future issues in the relationship, both Japan and the United States are more or less on the same page in terms of their priorities and broader vision for the Indo-Pacific region. The outcome of the U.S. election will define the path forward for their cooperation – and potentially create significant geopolitical turbulence in the region to which Japan will be forced to formulate a rapid response, especially in the scenario where a second Trump administration begins to decouple from its involvement in international security. The outcome of this week’s Japanese election, however, should not be overlooked – it too will have an impact on the shape of this relationship in future, arguably more so than any other Japanese election in recent memory. The potential for cooperation won’t evaporate if Japan’s politics becomes more complicated and fluid; but the struggle between the LDP’s reformists and conservatives, and the potential for a change of government if the ruling party cannot halt its decline in the coming months and years, will ultimately elevate people with very different visions for the future of Japan’s security and geopolitical policy.
Paul Nadeau is an adjunct assistant professor at Temple University's Japan campus, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Geoeconomics, and an adjunct fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was previously a private secretary with the Japanese Diet and as a member of the foreign affairs and trade staff of Senator Olympia Snowe. He holds a B.A. from the George Washington University, an M.A. in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and a PhD from the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy. He should be general manager of the Montreal Canadiens.
